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judicial power. Since this is the only method of commencing
action under the CPLR, the case was accordingly remanded
special term for proceedings to complete service on the infant
accordance with CPLR 309.2
In Matter of Beyer, the appointment of a guardian ad litem
was made in conjunction with a show cause order.2 3 The issue
to which the supreme court addressed itself was:
the power of the court to designate or require the designation of a
guardian24 ad litem in an order to show cause prior to the service
thereof.
On review, the appellate division responded that indeed "the
court possesses the express discretionary power to appoint, in
the first instance, a .guardian in an order to show cause ...
"2
The language of CPLR 403(d) clearly allows judicial discretion in a special proceeding that could* not be countenanced
in an action where there is a strict requirement of service of
process. This discretionary leeway permitted in a show cause
order appears to offer a palatable reconciliation of the
ostensible
26
conflict between the instant case and Matter of Beyer.
ARTICLE 6-

CPLR 602.:

J OINDa or CLAIMs, CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE
Place where motion for joint trial or consolidation
is made.

Barch v. Avco 2 7 one
out of the same airplane
County, while the other
County. Defendant moved

of four wrongful death actions arising
crash, was commenced in New York
three were commenced in Onondaga
in Onondaga County for a joint trial

22 "As in any proceeding, jurisdiction must be established before the court
can act. It is sound principle to hold that-a court cannot appoint a guardian
ad litem for an infant until it acquires jurisdiction over that infant. ..
1 WEINSTMN, KORN & MILLER, Nmv YoRK Crvn, PRAcncE 1309.04 (1964).
23 CPLR 403(d) provides that "[t]he court may grant an order to show
cause to be served, in lieu of a notice of petition at a time and in a manner
specified therein."
'24In re Beyer, 42 Misc. 2d 113, 247 N.Y.S.2d 358, 359 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County
1964).
25
In re Beyer, 21 App. Div. 2d 152, 249 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (1st Dep't

1964).

26 "Although the court did not mention the cases holding that a court
cannot appoint a guardian ad litem until it has acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the ward, its decision and reasoning seem to preclude the invocation of those cases as an obstacle to the use of the procedure outlined by the
court in this type of case under the CPLR" 2 W IcsT NI, KoRu &
MILLER, NEav YoRK CIVIL PRACTIcE ff1202.02 (1964).
27 ...... App. Div. 2d ...... 291 N.Y.S.2d 422 (4th Dep't 1968).
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determination of all four actions, and the supreme court granted
the motion. The appellate division, fourth department, reversed
the order because the movant failed to make his motion in
New York County 28 according to CPLR 2212(a) which requires
that a motion "shall be noticed to be heard in the judicial district
where the action is triable. .. "
The court further stated that the order was defective "for
there were no grounds asserted in any of the supporting affidavits
to justify a change of venue even if it had been permissible
for such relief to be granted. . . . [A]ll elements necessary for a
,, 29
motion for a change of venue were absent ....
It is submitted that, while the court was correct in reversing
the lower court's order because the movant did not follow the
letter of CPLR 2212(a), the result was perhaps harsh in this
case. If the movant, who was also a defendant in the Onondaga
actions, had captioned his motion in one of those actions there
would have been no defect because CPLR 2212(a) would have
been adhered to. The defendant, however, erred in using the
New York caption when he introduced his motion in Onondaga
County.
Furthermore, the court's statement that venue requirements
were not met (apparently the court believed that the movant
by noticing his motion in Onondaga County was really moving
for a change of venue under CPLR 510) made unnecessary
capital out of the movant's error in his motion for joint trial under
CPLR 602. In Smith v. Witteman,30 this same court responded
to the plaintiffs who opposed consolidation upon the ground that
there had been no showing of circumstances warranting a change
of venue:
This was not a valid ground for objection. The court has the power,
in an appropriate case, to order a consolidation or a joint trial of
actions pending in two counties and to direct the trial to be held in one
of the counties, thus incidentally changing the venue of the actions
pending in the other county without necessarily requiring a showing of
circumstances which would have independently justified the change of
venue.3 1

In Kiam;tesha v. Greenman,3 2 the court cited the above language
of the fourth department and confirmed the court's "discretion
in selecting the venue when consolidation is granted pursuant to

28 Id. at -,
20
App.

291 N.Y.S.2d at 425,
Div. 2d -, -, 291 M.Y.S.2d 422, 425 (4th Dep't 1968).
30 10 App. Div. 2d 793, 197 N.Y.S.2d 877 (4th Dep't 1960).
3
1 Id. at -, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
32 29 App. Div. 2d 904, 287 N.Y.S.2d 972 (3d Dep't 1968).
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CPLR 602."'s The court further stated that the factors involved
which relate to a change of venue under CPLR 510 are relevant
in the exercise of the court's discretion under CPLR 602. 3 4 Therefore, while the-same factors may be inherent in a motion under
CPLR 510 and CPLR 602, in the former these factors are controlling, whereas in the latter they are not.
ARTICLE 10- PARTiES GENERALLY

CPLR 1007:

Third party action based on subrogation where no
payment luhs been made allowed.

CPLR 1007 provides in part that "a defendant may proceed
against a person not a party who is or may be liable to him for
all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. .. ."
In Krause v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,35 plaintiff,
trustee in bankruptcy for one of the victims of the great "salad
oil swindle," sought recovery on broker's bonds issued by the
defendant insurance company. The insurance company sought to
implead the American Express Company and the issue was raised
as to whether CPLR 1007 permits a third-party action based on
subrogation where no payment has been made. The appellate
division held that impleader was permissible under the statute
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
In its opinion the Court of Appeals distinguished Ross v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co.36 and apparently limited it to automobile
collision cases. In Ross, the plaintiff-insured's contract with the
defendant-insurer provided that the defendant's right to subrogation
would not mature until payments were made under the policy. In
Krause there was no such policy term. However, Ross also
rested on the broader ground that impleader under CPLR 1007
should not be permitted to an insurer whose claim is based upon
rights to be gained by subrogation. This concept is based on the
reasoning37 of the dissent in Madison Ave. Props. Corp. v. Royal
Ins. Co. which required that "[t]he third party plaintiff must
have, at least, some color of a present cause of action." 38
The Court rejected this rationale finding it inappropriate to
the realities of the commercial type of litigation presented in
Krause. But, the Ross precedent was left undisturbed to govern

3

3

Id. 287 N.Y.S.2d at 974.

34 Id.

3522 N.Y.2d 147, 239 N.E.2d 175, 292 N.Y.S.Cl 67 (1968).
86 13 N.Y2d 233, 195 N.E.2d 892, 246 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1963).

87281 App. Div. 2d 641, 120 N.Y.S2d 626 (1st Dep't 1953).

w8Id. at 646, 120 N.Y.S2d at 631.

